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NEW TRENDS IN GREEK CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
 A COMMENT ON THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
REASON AND WILL
IOANNIS A. TASSOPOULOS*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The interplay between reason and will as elements of the law
illuminates the recent trends in Greek constitutional theory. These
trends are related to the quest for objectivity in constitutional
interpretation and can be viewed as a first response to the demand for
a better balance between reason and will.  These developments took
place particularly in light of the prevailing political and social
circumstances of normalcy in Greece, after the transition from
dictatorship to democracy in 1974.  Gradually, it has become clear
that the constitutional fundamentals of parliamentary democracy and
human rights are no longer at stake.1  In the new era, the Constitution
must be applied to controversial political issues even though its text
may not directly provide for these issues.
Part II of this Article discusses the roles of reason and will as
elements of the law.  Part III presents the Greek constitutional
tradition, in light of the relation between reason and will.  It explores
the notion that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the
fundamental tenet of Greek constitutional law.  Then, it presents the
prevailing constitutional theory in Greece—that reason and will
should coincide at the locus of sovereignty.  Moreover, Part III traces
the contemporary developments in Greek constitutional theory,
where reason and will are considered separate and distinct parts of
Copyright © 2000 by Ioannis A. Tassopoulos.
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LL.M., Duke University School of Law, 1987; S.J.D., Duke University School of Law, 1989.  I
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1. See P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in
Greece: 1974-1983, in TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE PROSPECTS FOR
DEMOCRACY 138, 139. (Guillermo O’Donnel et al. eds., 1986).
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constitutional decision-making.  Part IV outlines the circumstances
that provided the impetus for recent trends in Greek constitutional
theory.  Part V analyzes the effects of these contemporary
developments on the prevailing constitutional theory in Greece, and
discusses the basic reactions to the present predicament.  Part V also
highlights the stabilizing influence of the practice of constitutional law
on the sensitive balance between reason and will.  Finally, Part VI
explores the principle of equality, which provides an excellent
example of the practice of constitutional law stabilizing the
equilibrium between reason and will.
II.  REASON AND WILL AS ELEMENTS OF THE LAW
The interplay between reason and will spans the gap that divides
legal thought  This gap separates positive law—norms posited by the
law-maker and belonging to an overall effective legal system—from
evaluative judgments about the substantive merits of the law as a
criterion of legal validity, which falls under the rubric of natural law.
Thus, the contrast between voluntaristic and intellectual approaches
to natural law reflects whether reason or will is the qualitative feature
and motivating factor in the formation of natural law.2  A similar
tension between reason and will marks legal positivism.  Austin’s
theory of law as the commands of the law-giver3 and H. L. A. Hart’s
theory of law as a set of norms belonging to a legal system based on
the rule of recognition4 emphasize, respectively, the voluntaristic and
rational elements of positive law.  More recently, legal interpretation
has been dominated by debate over the application of a jurisprudence
of original intent5 versus an objectivist interpretation, relying on
either the common meaning of legal norms6 or a theory based on legal
principles embedded in social practice.7  This controversy concerns, at
least in part, the prevailing notion that law is a product of either
reason or will.
2. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 125-26 (2d. ed.
1995).
3. See id. at 517.
4. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (2d ed. 1994).
5. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA—THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143-55 (1990) (contending that democratic legitimacy may only be
achieved by applying laws with the meaning they carried at the time of their enactment).
6. See HART, supra note 4, at 120-21.
7. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 1-45 (1986).
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In the context of constitutional law, the element of will is linked
to authority—the exercise of lawful power.  By contrast, reason is
related to purpose (the substantive values exemplified in the law) as
its rationale (ratio legis), internal logic, and coherence.8  In other
words, reason and will are not by definition antithetical.  Rather, they
are complementary and interrelated, corresponding to different
aspects of decision-making.  However, it is still true that in mature
constitutional systems, like that of the United States, different
institutions are associated primarily with one element or the other.
Accordingly, in the United States, both Congress (the representative
body of the people) and the President (another bearer of democratic
legitimacy) together form the politically responsible organs of the
Constitution.  Unless they are properly questioned before a
competent judicial authority and determined to be unconstitutional or
illegal, acts issued under the authority of these institutions are legally
valid and binding, independent of their substantive merits.  Congress
and the President exercise legislative and executive power,
respectively; in contrast, the judiciary, headed by the Supreme Court,
possesses only the power of persuasion, derived from the sound
reasoning of their decisions.9  The authority of any court judgment,
lacking inherent or direct democratic legitimacy, depends primarily
on its legal justification.
III. THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION IN LIGHT
OF THE RELATION BETWEEN REASON AND WILL
The relation between reason and will is important for the
understanding of the Greek constitutional tradition.  It illuminates
the development of that tradition from consolidating reason and will
at the locus of sovereignty, to considering them as separate and
distinct aspects of constitutional decision-making.
A. The Supremacy of the Constitution as the Fundamental Principle
of the Greek Constitutional Tradition
To better understand recent trends in modern Greek
constitutional theory, it is necessary to clarify the idea of
constitutional supremacy, the fundamental characteristic of Greek
public law.  Since Greece established its independence in 1830, each
8. See K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 189 (1991).
9. See M. H. HART & A. M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 143-67 (1994).
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of its constitutions has been characterized by fairly rigid provisions.10
The distinction between the Constitution and statutes, formal laws
created by parliament, is deeply embedded in Greek public law.  In
1897, this dichotomy and the corresponding superiority of the
Constitution over statutes led to the recognition of judicial review of
the constitutionality of formal laws.11  It is striking that the text of the
10. Several important historical events and phases characterize Greek constitutional
history, beginning with Greece’s 1821 revolution against the Ottoman Empire.  Greece was
recognized as an independent state by the Protocol of London in 1830.  Between 1833 and 1843,
Greece was ruled as an absolute monarchy by King Otho.  On September 3, 1843, another
revolution ended the absolute monarchy and established a constitutional monarchy governed by
King Otho under the Constitution of 1844.  However, King Otho and the Wittelsbach Dynasty
were expelled from Greece in October 1862, and the Constitution of 1864 established the
principle of popular sovereignty.  George I became the first King of Greece to rule under this
new constitution.
The Constitution of 1864 was amended in 1911, further consolidating the Rule of Law and
marking a period of relative normalcy.  Constitutionalism was well embedded, the
parliamentary principle was further entrenched, and general elections became the focal point in
the development of political life.  In 1912, the Balkan Wars erupted and, in 1913, the Treaty of
London recognized the defeat of Turkey.  During the subsequent conflict among the Balkan
nations, Greece expanded its territory, liberating Macedonia.
In 1915, Greece encountered its largest crisis of the first half of the twentieth century: the
“National Schism.”  King Constantine sought to keep Greek neutral during World War I, while
the prime minister El. Venizelos wanted Greece to join the Entente, revealing an important
constitutional division.  While the anti-Venizelist forces were in power, Turkish forces defeated
the Greek army in the 1922 Asia Minor Campaign.  Following these events, the Republic was
proclaimed, but the republican Constitution of 1925 did not enter into force due to the brief
dictatorship of General Pangalos.
The Constitution of 1927 marked the beginning of the first true republican period.  In 1935,
the monarchy returned to Greece, and the following year, I. Metaxas, with the support of the
King, established a pro-fascist dictatorship.  In 1940, Italy declared war on Greece, drawing
Greece into World War II.  In the aftermath of the war, Greece fought a bitter Civil War from
1944 to 1949.
A new constitution took effect in 1952.  The Constitution of 1952 was similar to but more
conservative than the Constitution of 1864.  In the international context of the Cold War and
the post-Civil War Greek environment, an exclusive political system emerged, based on a
distinction between citizens who were nationally minded and citizens who were disloyal.  There
was a dominant anti-communism ideology.
During the 1960s, social pressure led to the liberalization of the political system.  After the
1967 military coup, however, the country was ruled by dictatorship until 1974, when the
dictatorship collapsed following a national crisis in Cyprus.  In the referendum of 1974, the
people voted in favor of the republican form of government.  The new democratic and
republican Constitution was enacted in 1975.  The constitutional amendment of 1986 abolished
the important political powers of the President of the Republic.  For a further elaboration on
the constitutional history of Greece, see generally RICHARD CLOGG, A SHORT HISTORY OF
MODERN GREECE (1979).
11. See, e.g., VASILIOS SKOURIS & EVAGELOS VENIZELOS,   	
 

   25 [JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
LAWS] (1985) (discussing decision 23/1897 of the Greek Constitutional Court (Areios Pagos)).
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Constitution of 1864 does not explicitly grant this power to the courts.
Rather, judicial review follows as a logical consequence of the very
concept of the Constitution, and it is derived from a construction of
the document as a whole.12  Until 1927, judicial review of the
constitutionality of the laws was exercised as a custom; the
Constitution of 1927 offered the first explicit guarantee of the
institution of judicial review.13  The present Greek Constitution,
adopted in 1975, provides that judges must not enforce any law that is
contrary to the Constitution.14  As a consequence, every judge is
empowered to control the constitutionality of the laws and render
judgment over their validity.  However, declaring a law
unconstitutional does not annul that law; it only renders the law
inapplicable to the pending case.15  Moreover, the current Greek
Constitution only permits substantive judicial review.  The procedural
vices of the law are not subject to control.  This is a decentralized and
diffused system of judicial review, exercised on the occasion of a
pending case or controversy.  As such, it is similar to the American
system of judicial review.
 B.  The Locus of Sovereignty as the Bedrock of Reason and Will
The Constitution of 1864 guaranteed popular sovereignty in
Greece for the first time.16  Yet its implications and consequences did
not easily prevail in Greek political life, since it met resistance from
the Greek throne.  In 1915, King Constantine tried to maintain a
politically decisive role, dissolving parliament in abuse of the royal
See also Epaminondas Spiliotopoulos, Judicial Review of Legislative Acts in Greece, 56 TEMP.
L.Q. 463, 463 (1983).
12. See SKOURIS & VENIZELOS, supra note 11, at 24.
13. See  	
	 1927 [Constitution 1927] art. 5.  “The judicial function is exercised by
independent courts, subject only to the laws… Interpretive Clause on art. 5: The true meaning
of the provision is that the courts are obliged not to apply a law the content of which is contrary
to the Constitution.”  Id.
14. See 	
	 1975, art. 93, para. 4 (amended 1986) [hereinafter 	
	
Constitution].  “The courts are obliged not to apply a law the content of which is contrary to the
Constitution.”  Id.
15. But see 
 [Constitution] art. 100, paras. 1(e), 4.  The two paragraphs provide,
respectively, that a Special Highest Court has jurisdiction over cases concerning specific
provisions of law (on which the highest courts of Greece have rendered conflicting judgments
regarding constitutionality) and that the provisions of law declared unconstitutional by the
Special Highest Court are invalid as of the date of publication of the respective judgement.  This
possibility is rare in the Greek system of judicial review.
16. See NIKOS K. ALIVIZATOS, 

   
 
[INTRODUCTION TO GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY] 83 (1981).
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prerogative.17  Moreover, the throne’s interpretation and use of
constitutional provisions, such as Article 31 of the Constitution of
1952 (stating that “the king appoints and dismisses his ministers”),
contradicted the spirit of a democratic regime.18  In 1965, the king
directly questioned the right of the prime minister to choose his
ministers.19  The royal reading of the Constitution often deviated from
the spirit of democratic government, indicating that ultimately, the
locus of sovereignty was at stake.20
Under these circumstances, the primary issue for Greek
constitutional theory was the establishment of the view that, in a
democracy, the people have the power (within the limits of the
Constitution) to make substantive political choices and decisions, no
matter how detrimental or unwise they may appear to the king.  In
other words, the objective at this time was to establish, as a matter of
principle, that both reason and will reside in the sovereign.  Any
effort to remove either of these elements from the locus of
sovereignty would constitute a grossly undemocratic mistrust of the
judgment of the people, eventually leading to a depletion of their
power.
From 1915 onward,21 the polarized political atmosphere gradually
led to severe restrictions on the free expression of political opinion.22
After the Greek Civil War of the 1940s, the defeat of the Communist
Party, and the rise of the Cold War, an ethnocentric and anti-
communist state emerged in Greece, perpetuating repressive
measures against the political left for many years after internal strife
ended.23  As a consequence, in the area of fundamental rights, during
the 1960s, Greek constitutional theory criticized the authoritarian
inclinations of the state, which excluded those who were stigmatized
17. See id. at 110.
18. ARISTOVOULOS I. MANESSIS,  	

	 	  

[GUARANTEES FOR THE OBSERVATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] 155 (1991).
19. See  J. MEYNAUD,   	   	   
1965 [THE ROYAL DEVIATION FROM PARLIAMENTARISM IN JULY 1965] 55, 76 (1967).
20. See ALIVIZATOS, supra note 16, at 115.
21. See generally GEORGE MAVROGORDATOS, STILLBORN REPUBLIC—SOCIAL
COALITIONS AND PARTY STRATEGIES IN GREECE, 1922-1936 (1983) (providing contextual
information on Greek politics during this era).
22. See generally IOANNIS A. TASSOPOULOS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF
SUBVERSIVE ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND GREECE (1993)
(examining problems caused by the efforts to suppress subversive advocacy in Greece during
the years of unrest  and civil war between 1915 and the end of the 1940s).
23. See NIKOS ALIVIZATOS,   	 	  1922-1974 [THE POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS] (1983).
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as politically left-minded from normal integration into social and
political life.  The demand for liberalization and respect for
fundamental rights complemented the demand for democratization of
the Greek state and society.
In light of this historical background, Professor Aristovoulos
Manessis developed the prevailing paradigm in Greek constitutional
theory.  Manessis has focused on the importance of the principle of
legality and the need for scrupulous application of the rules of the
game as specified in the Constitution.24  Closely related to the
principle of legality are the demands for legal certainty and a clear
delimitation of constitutionally protected liberties.25  In terms of
substantive constitutional values, Manessis has persuasively argued
for democratization and liberalization of political life through the
protection of the right to dissent and full compliance with the Rule of
Law, irrespective of the political ideologies of the citizenry.26
Specifically, Manessis’ constitutional theory can be broken down
into four main points.  First, the central issue in constitutional law is
the relationship between those who govern and those who are
governed (i.e., a relationship between persons of unequal standing).27
Second, the power relationship between the governing and the
governed is ultimately grounded in the power of the former to impose
their will upon the latter.28  In a realistic spirit, Manessis and other
positivists proclaim that “ex facto oritur jus,” or “from fact is born the
law.” 29  These first two points capture the bare essence of the nature
of political authority, without any legitimizing ornament or
embellishment.  In light of these considerations, the third facet of the
theory emphasizes the pivotal role of the formal Constitution (the
supreme, rigid, written document) in protecting political liberty.30
Constitution-making provides a strong guarantee for the protection of
civil liberties and the sustainment of mutual checks and balances
among the various organs of the state, preventing absolutist turns in
24. See ARISTOVOULOS MANESSIS, 
  [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 164
(1980) (emphasizing Sieyes’ statement: “Une Constitution est un corps de lois obligatoires, ou
ce n’est rien” (a constitution is a body of obligatory laws, otherwise it is nothing)).
25. See Aristovoulos Manessis,  	
     
 [The Constitutional Law as a Technique of Political Liberty], 16 	
[ARMENOPOULOS] 535, 541-42 (1962).
26. See MANESSIS, supra note 24, at 82.
27. See id. at 91, 99.
28. See id. at 83, 91.
29. Id. at 88-89.
30. See Manessis, supra note 25.
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the exercise of authority.31  As such, constitutional guarantees play a
central role in Manessis’ work.  Constitutional guarantees differ from
sanctions for the violation of a law; they primarily aim to prevent the
abuse of power by granting mutual political control of the
constitutional organs rather than by means of direct legal coercion.32
Finally, Manessis’ constitutional theory culminates in the central
position accorded to the democratic principle, in conformity with
article 1, paragraph 2 of the Greek Constitution of 1975/1986, which
provides that popular sovereignty forms the foundation of the
regime.33  Manessis’ theory particularly emphasizes the institutional
role of the electorate as the final arbiter of any divisive political
controversy.34  Within the limits of the republican Constitution and
with full respect for the freedom of the dissenter—which is the only
true freedom35—the members of society are constitutionally
empowered to freely make their substantive choices.  Consequently,
according to this prevailing paradigm of Greek constitutional theory,
the locus of sovereignty is the bedrock of both reason and will.
C.  Reason and Will as Distinct Aspects of Constitutional Decision-
Making
Manessis’ writings have contributed substantially to furthering
the concept that the Greek Constitution combines the principles of
Rule of Law and democracy.  In this sense, his analysis provides a
sound basis for further developments in the field of constitutional
theory.  Gradually, constitutional theorists came to believe that the
republican Constitution of 1975 settled all of the fundamental issues
of the previous decades.  After 1975, principles of democracy,
parliamentarianism (the political responsibility of the government
before the parliament), or the protection of the Rule of Law and the
right to dissent were no longer primary concerns.  In this respect, the
post-1975 scene differed decisively from the situation that
characterized Greek constitutional law of the interwar and postwar
years.  The power of the sovereign people to express their will ceased
to be a contested issue.  As the system gained maturity, the interplay
31. See MANESSIS, supra note 24, at 131.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 37.
34. See id. at 172.
35. See id. at 82.
TASSOPOULOS.DOC 03/27/00  8:35 PM
1999] NEW TRENDS IN GREEK CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 231
between reason and will became more flexible, more intense, and
more controversial.36
Consequently, scholars discussed constitutional decision-making
in light of the distinction between reason and will, where each
concept represents distinct aspects of the decision, and, as such, each
has to be analyzed and treated independently.  In addition, the test
for the proportionality of the law made the requirement for
reasonableness endemic to Greek constitutional analysis.37  Moreover,
theoretical approaches to constitutional decision-making, influenced
by the Anglo-Saxon tradition, developed the idea that amongst the
constitutional organs, the courts were most associated with the
elements of justification and reasoned elaboration of their decisions.38
As a result of these developments, the critical issues emerging in
the context of Greek constitutional theory changed.  The new issues
primarily focused on the quest for objectivity in constitutional
interpretation.  In this respect, the traditional and prevailing
approach, which emphasized legal certainty over constitutional
fundamentals, seemed to be of little help.  For example, acceptance of
the legally binding character of the Constitution could not settle the
fundamental issues of how judicial review should be exercised: What
are the boundaries of law, beyond which the realm of politics begins?
Is it even possible to separate law and politics in a formalist manner?
How does a judge interpret the vague and controversial meanings of
certain constitutional concepts such as liberty, equality, human value,
abuse of rights, and protection of the environment?  Is a judge
competent to inquire into the moral, historical, economic, and
sociological implications of the litigated case?  When exploring the
meaning of the Constitution, is it legitimate for a judge to navigate
such dangerous waters?
36. See discussion infra Part IV.
37. See Vassilis Voutsakis,    	   
  
 , in 	    [The Principle of Proportionality: From the
Interpretation to the Formation of the Law, in ASPECTS OF THE RULE OF LAW] 205 (Kostas
Stamatis ed., 1990).
38. See PAVLOS SOURLAS,        		 
 	 [THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS AND THE FOUNDING OF
LEGAL JUDGMENTS] 68-69 (1989).
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IV.  A FERTILE BACKGROUND FOR THE NEW INTERPLAY
BETWEEN REASON AND WILL
As so often happens in life, practice first sets the new agenda and
then creates the impetus for constitutional theory to provide the
relevant answers.  Such is the case with Greek constitutional theory in
the post-1975 period.
A. The Beginning of the New Era: “Alevras’ Vote”
The 1985 presidential election by the Greek Parliament was a
landmark event in the development of the contemporary
constitutional debate.  The critical question was a rather technical
one: when the president of the Voule (the Greek Parliament) is also,
ex constitutione, acting president of the Republic, can he participate in
the parliamentary voting for the election of the president of the
Republic?  The Constitution merely provided that the office of the
president of the Republic is incompatible with any other office or
activity.39  Notwithstanding its technical character, the political
importance of the answer was indeed immense.
The socialist party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK), and its powerful leader, Andreas Papandreou, had led the
public and the press to believe that PASOK would support C.
Karamanlis, the traditional leader of the conservatives, for a second
consecutive term in office.  Karamanlis’ major achievement was
1974’s peaceful transition from authoritarian dictatorship to
democracy.  He is also well known for playing a pivotal role in
Greece’s admittance to the European Community in 1981.40
However, before the parliamentary vote for the presidential election,
Papandreou unexpectedly dropped Karamanlis’ candidacy and
named Ch. Sartzetakis, who was a judge of the Areios Pagos (the
Greek Supreme Court for Civil and Penal Jurisdiction).  President
Karamanlis immediately resigned and the president of the Voule, I.
Alevras, became ex constitutione acting president of the Republic.
39. See 
 1975 [Constitution 1975] art. 30, para. 2, art. 34, para. 1.  Article 30,
paragraph 2 provides that “[t]he office of the President shall be incompatible with any other
office, position or function,” while art. 34, para. 1 provides that if the president of the Republic
should resign, “he shall be temporarily replaced by the Speaker of Parliament.”
40. See generally GEORGE PAPADIMITRIOU,  
    
	 	 [THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN
UNIFICATION] (1982) (discussing the constitutional framework for Greece’s admittance into the
European Union).
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With the tension building up to an institutional crisis,41 PASOK
needed the vote of the president of the Voule to elect its favored
candidate.  Indeed, Ch. Sartzetakis became president of the Republic
with the bare majority required by the Constitution (180 votes); the
last, and most controversial, vote came from Alevras, who was then
the president of the Voule and acting president of the Republic.  The
situation was further complicated by the fact that the Constitution
provided no institutional authority, judicial or otherwise, that could
finally resolve the dispute over the constitutionality of “Alevras’
vote.”
Within this political context, the issue of constitutional
interpretation acquired cardinal importance.  Constitutional scholars
presented arguments supporting and refuting the right of the
president of the Voule to vote in a presidential election when he
concurrently held the position of acting president of the Republic.42
The debate focused on the following methodological question: in a
situation where a number of incompatible opinions are offered to
answer a legal problem, can there be one particular opinion that
excludes all others?43
Legal scholars were divided on the issue.  Those who answered in
the negative did so in light of the implicit assumption that the search
for the separation between law and politics in the process of
constitutional interpretation can never be affirmed in a conclusive,
final, and undisputed manner.44  Consequently, when there are no
clear criteria compelling a certain resolution of a disagreement, the
issue is one of authority (that is, institutional competence to settle the
matter).45  Because Parliament is the only constitutional organ
41. See ARISTOVOULOS MANESSIS,  
 	  1986 [THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION OF 1986] 8-9 (1989).
42. See generally    
 	  
 [THE CHRONICLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL-POLITICAL TENSION, LAW AND
POLITICS] (George Anastasiadis ed., 1985) (providing a detailed chronicle of “Alevras’ vote,”
including statements of politicians and constitutional scholars).
43. See Antonis Manitakis,  !
 "#   $ %  &

 	
, in 	  
  	
  	 [The
Legal Nature and the Political Character of the Interpretation of the Constitution, in
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND FUNCTION OF THE REGIME] 37, 42 (1996).
44. See Evagelos Venizelos,  
  	
 
'# 
 	
 

  in  	  
     
		
  
   [The Interpretation of the Constitution Between
Legal Doctrine and Scientific Frankness, in THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAWS] 53, 56 (1994).
45. See id. at 60.
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enjoying direct democratic legitimacy, if the authority approach to
“Alevras’ vote” prevails, Parliament should be the institution to
decide the constitutional question.46  Thus, in the final analysis, reason
depends on and succumbs to will.  As the maxim goes, auctoritas non
veritas facit legem (authority, not truth, makes law);47 constitutional
law may be no exception.
Critics have pointed out that by shifting the center of
constitutional analysis from the persuasiveness of the arguments to
the determination of who has the greatest authority to resolve
constitutional questions, this approach espouses a dangerous
constitutional relativism.48  As a result, the parliamentary majority
would not only have the authority to impose its view over the
minority, but it could also present its view as constitutionally
legitimate and justified.  This relativism effaces the distinction
between reason and will as aspects of constitutional decision-
making.49  Eventually, it undermines the rule of law, which
presupposes the possibility of objectively evaluating arguments as
more or less persuasive.50  By giving up this ideal of objective
interpretation, relativism leads to a lack of unity and coherence in
legal discourse,51 thus relegating constitutional debate to a contrived
exercise to support the most politically expedient result.
Legal scholars tried to find a response to this predicament
concerning the objectivity of legal interpretation.  For some,
objectivity may be hard to attain; one can hardly find the true
meaning of a provision independent of substantive theoretical
presuppositions about what a constitution is—its context, purpose,
and function.  Therefore, the assumption can no longer be that
constitutional interpretation is best accomplished by focusing on the
document’s formal language in a quest to proceed in a disengaged
and neutral manner.  However, these presuppositions do not need to
be the product of a free-riding and arbitrary subjective will.
Excessive voluntarism in the choice of guiding principles can be
tamed through a normative reading of political and constitutional
46. See id. at 89-90; see also Kostas Mavrias,  
  	
 
'#
 '	  
# 	
, in  		  
 [The
Interpretation of the Constitution Between Political Evaluation and Legal Doctrine, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] 236, 248 (Demetres Tsatsos ed., 1995).
47. See Venizelos, supra note 44, at 60.
48. See Manitakis, supra note 43, at 40-43.
49. See id. at 41-42; see also SOURLAS, supra note 38, at 63, 165-68.
50. See Manitakis, supra note 43, at 43.
51. See SOURLAS, supra note 38, at 61, 198, 218.
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history.  From such a reading, the priority of the democratic principle
emerges, providing the ultimate criterion of constitutional analysis.52
Thus, the correct construction of the document is the one that is most
congenial and consistent with democratic principles.
Other legal scholars approached the issue of objectivity in legal
interpretation by focusing on the development of constitutional
principles.53  But they did not deem such principles to be neutral
values that constrained the unfettered discretion of a judge.54  In
addition, the quest for principles in Greek constitutional law operated
at the level of constitutional text, more so than with adjudication per
se.  These principles are a source of normative meaning that is
derived not so much from the conceptual or literal analysis of the
document, but rather from the purpose, values, and ends developed
by the interpreter.55  The objective answer to constitutional disputes
cannot be found in the narrow and pre-existing scheme of the norm’s
literal meaning; rather, it must be established in a positive way by the
most compelling argument.56  Thus, principles become flexible
criterion, replacing the formal and sometimes sterile black-letter law
and proving useful in evaluating the clarity, strength, and
persuasiveness of arguments employed in constitutional discourse.57
In fact, this turn from literal analysis to elaboration of constitutional
principles reflects the increasingly argumentative nature of
contemporary Greek constitutional law.  In an effort to strike the
right balance in the controversial relationship between reason and
will as elements of the law, the emergence of principles marks the
shift toward a new paradigm.
52. See Demetres Tsatsos, ( )
  
  , in  	 

 [The Problem of the Interpretation of the Constitution, in THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION] 13, 47-48 (Demetres Tsatsos ed., 1995).
53. See George Papadimitriou,  
	 

  
 
	
, in  	  
 [The Methodological Edifice of the
Interpretation of the Constitution, in THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] 253, 265
(Demetres Tsatsos ed., 1995).
54. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in
PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 27 (1961).
55. See Papadimitriou, supra note 53, at 265-67.
56. See TASSOPOULOS, supra note 22, at 100.
57. See ANTONIS MANITAKIS,     	
 

   [THE RULE OF LAW AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAWS] 170, 441 (1994).
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B. The Ever–Expanding Penumbra of Some Constitutional
Provisions
Another issue generating theoretical concerns relates to the
growing importance of case law.  Under the 1975 Constitution,
constitutional jurisprudence increased both in size and importance
throughout the 1980s and onward.58  The penumbra of some
constitutional provisions seemed ever-expanding, bringing within
reach areas of social life that had previously been beyond the control
of constitutional law.  This phenomenon has been called the
“diffusion” of the Constitution.59
From one perspective, the broadening transformation of complex
social issues into constitutional cases and controversies is a sign of
strength and an affirmation of the Constitution’s efficacy.  However,
the cost of this increased constitutionalization was a decrease in
normative density and a loss of analytical vigor and theoretical
insight.  Under such conditions, it becomes all the more uncertain
whether the facts of a litigated case really fall under the Constitution
and what the Constitution might or might not provide.  Constitutional
balancing of the values implicated in the litigated facts frequently
leads (more or less intensely) to the emergence of ad hoc
pragmatism,60 where constitutional questions turn not on issues of
constitutional law, but rather on a judge’s overall assessment of a
case’s factual situation.61  Such a development demonstrates that
constitutional law frequently must tackle technical, polycentric (yet
politically sensitive) problems, whose significance is highly
problematic under the color of law.
Although the expansion of the constitutional penumbra did not
occur with regard to every provision, the most drastic results followed
the interpretation of article 24 of the Constitution, which makes the
protection of the environment a duty of the state.62  From the elliptic
constitutional language, the Fifth Section of the Council of State (the
58. See IOANNIS D. SARMAS,  
   
 
  		 [THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE] 541 (1990).
59. See YANNIS DROSSOS,  	 
 	 [AN ESSAY ON
GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY] 493 (1996).
60. See Prokopis Pavlopoulos,  *	  	
  
 
 *	  

  	
 [Judicial Review of the Constitutionality
of the Laws or Judicial Review of the Legality of the Constitution?],   [LEGAL
PODIUM] 13, 29, 34 (1988).
61. See DROSSOS, supra note 59, at 546-50.
62. See 
 [Constitution] art. 24.
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Greek Supreme Court for Administrative Jurisdiction) created an
impressive jurisprudential structure with twelve basic constitutional
principles, including the principle of sustainable development.63
Through determination and bold language, the Council of State
substantially affected the prevailing developmental model within the
political branches of government.  The most notorious example is the
diversion of the Acheloos River from the west to the east of Greece.
This major project was aimed at increasing production capacity, but
because of its environmental consequences, it was cut down by the
Council of State.64
The principle of equality before the law presents another area
where the judiciary confirmed its traditional activism.65  Here,
notwithstanding the apparently opposite intention of the legislature,
the courts (both the Areios Pagos and the Council of State) not only
exempted cases which should not fall under the reach of over-
inclusive laws, but expanded the scope of other statutory provisions
where there were under-inclusive laws.  This occurred particularly in
cases concerning social security and other aspects of the welfare state
and where decisions of the courts had substantial financial and
budgetary impacts.  The expansion of the scope of provisions through
judicial interpretation particularly involved the income of judges.
The courts ruled that income-increasing provisions should apply to
members of the judiciary, just as they apply to other categories of
persons as provided by the law.66
The above examples are not exclusive.  In those and other
situations, the activism of the courts reinvigorated the debate over the
legitimacy of judicial review.67  In fact, in this area of constitutional
law, the interplay between reason and will is at its most sensitive.
How does one distinguish between controversial judicial decisions
that are the result of judicial voluntarism and those that expound
constitutional principle and reason?
63. See MICHAEL DEKLERIS,  		  	 [THE CATALOGUE OF
TWELVE PRINCIPLES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT] 141, 142 (1996).
64. See id.
65. See THEODORA D. ANTONIOU,         [EQUALITY
WITHIN AND THROUGH THE LAW] 204 (1998).
66. See id.
67. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73 (1980).
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C. Judicial Activism by Omission: The Quest for Developing
Substantive Reasons in Constitutional Analysis
The bulk of Greek constitutional decisions often remain obscure
and lack thorough, persuasive justification, since they do not explain
the underlying rationale of constitutional provisions as applied to
specific cases.68  This style of judicial decisions is similar to that of
other civil law countries, such as France, where courts provide dry
and sometimes sterile reasoning that merely repeats the rule’s
language and fails to provide further inquiry into its meaning.69
Though there are a few exceptions (mainly in the Council of State’s
environmental jurisprudence), this sparing style of decision writing
remains the general practice.
On many occasions, Greek courts defer to the elected legislature,
sustaining limitations of constitutional rights on the basis of a vague
and unspecified public or general interest.70  If judicial activism does
not actually turn on the drastic effects of a court’s decision to declare
a law unconstitutional, but rather on the lack of persuasiveness and
compelling justification of the result, then the aforementioned
limitation of fundamental liberties is an example of judicial activism
by omission.71
In fact, the more persuasive the substantive reasons supporting
the judicial decision, the less the decision can be criticized as the
product of an arbitrary will.  Therefore, in the constitutional interplay
between reason and will, reason serves as the justification of will and
not vice-versa.
68. See Konstantinos Kerameus,  	  + ,, in 
	
   	   	    
	 [The Reasoning of Judicial Opinions, in THE REASONING OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS,
THE DISSENTING OPINIONS, THE CRITICISM OF LEGAL OPINIONS] 29, 40-43 (Charoula
Apalagaki ed., 1992).
69. See JOHN D. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 380-85, 407-11 (1968); see also
Kerameus, supra note 68, at 39.
70. See EVAGELOS VENIZELOS,  
	 	   	 

  [THE GENERAL INTEREST AND THE LIMITATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS] 185-87 (1990).
71. See Ioannis A. Tassopoulos, -      *	 
	
  
 
  )
   
 	 

    
 [The Role of the Judge in the Judicial Review of the
Constitutionality of the Laws: Self-Restraint or Activism?, in THE CONSTITUTION—
CONFERENCE ON TWENTY YEARS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1975] 339, 373 (1998).
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V.  LEAVING THE CITADEL OF THE CONSTITUTION’S
FORMAL LANGUAGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CENTRIFUGAL AND CENTRIPETAL FORCES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The developments described in the previous Part indicate that
Greek constitutional theory could no longer find shelter in the
Constitution’s formal language, which preserved the fundamentals of
democracy: freedom, equality, and parliamentary supremacy, as it
was doing throughout the 1960s.  In the new political environment,
constitutional fundamentals are no longer at stake; disagreement
concerns controversial political decisions.  These two categories do
not necessarily coincide. In this context, Greek constitutional law
must preserve its fundamental tenet, which is the rigid character of
the Constitution.
As already noted, the prevailing approach to legal positivism
emphasizes the value of legal certainty.72  However, as one moves on
to the penumbra of legal concepts, where uncertainty prevails
regarding the limits of the law, a challenge becomes evident.  Once
one strays beyond the relatively undisputed core meaning of legal
concepts, once the solid legal ground as understood by the positivist
doctrine is exhausted, then considerable disagreement arises over the
extension of a constitutional provision.73  Such disagreement may
engender the development of centrifugal forces in constitutional law.
These forces come into play through arguments concerning morality,
social science, and other non-legal sources and disciplines.  Such
methodologies are employed in constitutional discourse and are
increasingly considered relevant to the resolution of constitutional
controversies.  Two opposite tendencies form these centrifugal forces.
The first tendency could be classified as moralist and
deontological.  In order to answer the apparent need to stretch the
legal meaning of the Constitution, it proposes the adoption of a moral
ideal.  According to a common version of this ideal, every person,
living within the state should be treated with equal concern and
respect.74  Of course, this is hardly surprising.  The Constitution is not
merely a legal document—it is also an ethical one.  It is possible to
associate individual rights (such as life, liberty, property, and free
72. See MANESSIS, supra note 24, at 101-03.
73. See HART, supra note 4, at 118.
74. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 192,
203 (1994).
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speech) and political rights (such as free formation of political parties
and the right to vote), with a certain concept of the person.  For
example, as a private person, the autonomous human being is the
author of his or her own life, while, as a citizen, he or she is a part of
the sovereign political body.  The next step is to project this view as
the philosophical background of the Constitution.  In cases of
uncertainty and disagreement, the concept of the person comes
forward to provide complementary arguments for the resolution of
difficult constitutional problems.  Although recourse to that concept
has been justified by the need to locate the outer boundary of the law,
it often has the tendency to expand the normative meaning of the
constitutional provision until it is virtually identified with the adopted
ideal of the person.  In that sense, the moral ideal does not provide
the necessary constraint in constitutional adjudication.  Rather, it
operates as a centrifugal force.  This view has had relatively limited
impact in Greece, mainly because it was inconsistent with the
prevailing theory of legal positivism.75
The second tendency could be classified as realistic and
pragmatic.  As discussed previously, constitutional balancing
frequently leads to the emergence of ad hoc pragmatism, where
constitutional questions turn not so much on issues of constitutional
law, but rather on the overall judgment of the decision-maker on the
specific factual situation at issue.76  Balancing does not amount to
interpretation or aim to clarify the meaning of the Constitution, but
rather it is a technique to apply the Constitution in situations
involving more than one fundamental value.  Eventually, the
insufficiency of legal meaning is supplemented by the subjective
choices or the hunch of the interpreter.77 Compared with the first
moralist deontological tendency, the realistic pragmatic tendency
leads to the opposite result: it overstates the importance of pragmatic
considerations and it diminishes the normative meaning of the
Constitution to its undisputed core, thus leading to an impoverished
concept of the law.
75. In fact, Manessis effectively criticized it in his writings.  See, e.g., MANESSIS, supra note
24, at 174-76.
76. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J.
943, 945 (1987) (suggesting that the totality of the circumstances affects the value accorded to a
specific question).
77. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 282 (1929).
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As already mentioned, both perspectives—the moralistic
deontological and the realistic pragmatic—can exert a centrifugal
influence on constitutional law.  If pushed to the extreme, the
perspectives tend to disintegrate the legal universe by over-
emphasizing limited and partial aspects.  The moralist stresses the
ideal element of law—its rational aspect—whereas the realist
expresses skepticism concerning constraints on the decision-maker,
thereby emphasizing the voluntaristic element of the law.78  It is likely
that the moralist welcomes the judicial expounding of the
Constitution to the extent that the courts are associated primarily
with the element of reason.79  By contrast, for the pragmatist, the
institution of judicial review provides the courts with the power to
make law.  The principle question is how to balance two essentially
political organs: the democratic legislature and the counter-
majoritarian judiciary.80
78. See WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14
(1984).  Van Alstyne analyzes similar problems in American constitutional law:
For some, the Constitution is only too clear in certain particulars, but the clarity it
yields is extremely disappointing. The actual Constitution does not fulfil one’s
expectations; it does not exalt what one hopes and it is not commensurate with one’s
notion of a constitution as ideal norm. “The” judicial duty is therefore to adjust the
Constitution by degree, to be guided by a meta-Constitution super-imposed upon the
inadequate original, to bring it around to normative maturity.
For others, it is quite the opposite point that the Constitution is insufficiently clear in
nearly all of its most significant clauses, specifically its most normative clauses such as
the due process clause, the equal protection clause, or the ninth amendment virtually
in its entirety. Accordingly, “the” judicial duty is to impute some meaning without
which the constitutionality of statutes cannot be determined and to impute that
meaning according to some notion of what courts might do that neither duplicates
legislative processes nor leaves these clauses virtually useless in litigation.
Id.
79. See PERRY,  supra note 74, at 203.
In constitutional adjudication, the courts represent the political community by testing
various policies and practices of the community’s governments against the
community’s fundamental political-moral directives.  Moreover and relatedly, the
courts represent the political community in constitutional adjudication by specifying
constitutional directives in contexts to which they are relevant but in which they are
indeterminate—novel contexts that constantly emerge in the ongoing life of the
historically extended community . . . .  In that sense, constitutional adjudication—the
judicial specification of indeterminate constitutional principles—is one of the primary
institutionalizations of the self-critical rationality of the American political
community . . . .
Id.; see generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231-40 (1993) (considering the role of
public reason in constitutional adjudication from a philosophical frame of reference).
80. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE 212 (1997).
There is a discursive convention denying that judicial law makers are engaged in an
ideological practice.  Most members of the intelligentsias (including the judges
themselves) believe that there is some truth to the convention, that is, they deny the
ideological in adjudication.  They consistently exaggerate the difference between what
judges do when they decide appellate questions of law in adjudication and what
legislatures do when they decide them by deliberating and then voting on statutes.
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The tension between reason and will, so prominent in theory,
rarely becomes an overt antithesis in everyday legal and political life.
In the actual operation of the constitutional system, notwithstanding
the occasional judgment of the courts that some acts are
unconstitutional and therefore inapplicable, the judiciary does not
and cannot fundamentally undermine the power of the political
organs to govern.  Yet, by losing sight of the complementary and
interrelated character of reason and will in the process of decision-
making, both centrifugal tendencies question the theoretical
underpinnings of that equilibrium.  The interplay between reason and
will can become menacing when their equilibrium is profoundly
distorted.
Confronted with these centrifugal forces, constitutional theory
should rediscover some old truisms: legal institutions are embedded
in and exist at the societal level with specific social functions.  Thus,
no matter what moral ideals or skepticism are projected upon the
law,81 constitutional theory retains a basic duty to locate the
centripetal forces that have a gravitational effect upon the law,
thereby giving the law structure and substance.  Obviously, the false
dilemma of the centrifugal forces between reason and will should be
avoided.  For this to be possible, however, one can neither perceive
the law as a self-sufficient and closed set of concepts, nor can one
regard society as an amorphous clay to be shaped passively by the
lawmaker.82  The relationship between law and society is a symbiotic
one of a potentially constructive and reinforcing interaction.  Reason
is not exclusively a feature of law; will is not exclusively a feature of
politics.  Both elements are present in decision-making.  Instead of
focusing upon one aspect of the dilemma between reason and will, the
centripetal forces try to illuminate the nature of the interaction
between legal and political decision-making.
Such centripetal forces may be linked to the useful role that
practice can play in constitutional law.  Greek constitutional theory
has emphasized the potential contribution of practice to the quest of
Id.; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934)
(outlining an attempt to develop a pragmatic approach to the Constitution as expounded by the
Court).
81. See generally H. L. A. HART, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The
Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123, 124-25
(1983).
82. See H. L. A HART, Jhering’s Heaven of Concepts and Modern Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 265, 269-71 (1983).
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objectivity in constitutional analysis.83  Constitutional practice
becomes the zone of convergence between the values that are
recognized in the constitutional text and the operation of the legal
system in society.  However, practice can set an objective horizon for
the development of legal argumentation only to the extent that
practice is constitutionally justified.84  Specifically, only when practice
is consistently interpreted and evaluated in light of constitutional
values, can it offer the interpretive paradigms attached to the
constitutional rule.  These paradigms represent the characteristic
occasions of its application, constitute the core meaning of the
provision, and define its basic content.85  Consequently, constitutional
practice may prove pivotal in preserving the necessary equilibrium
between reason and will as elements of the law.
VI.  THE ROLE OF PRACTICE IN THE INTERPLAY
BETWEEN REASON AND WILL: THE CASE OF EQUALITY
The principle of equality provides an example of the stabilizing
effect of practice in the interplay between reason and will.  The
principle of equality, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme
Court of the United States, involves judgments over the
reasonableness of the allegedly discriminatory classifications
83. See Manitakis, supra note 43, at 55.
84. See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 70-72 (1986) (identifying an inherent reliance on a
concept in any related conceptions regarding its interpretation); see also NICOS
STAVROPOULOS, OBJECTIVITY IN LAW 125, 155 (1996).
85. It is suggested that accepting the critical contribution of constitutional practice to the
objectivity of constitutional interpretation does not commit one to Dworkin’s view of the judge
as “Hercules.”  See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 264.  That view may be true of common law
countries, but it is alien to the constitutional tradition of continental countries.  Moreover, the
version of “constructive interpretation” that is “a matter of imposing purpose on an object or
practice in order to make of it the best possible example of  the form or genre to which it is
taken to belong,” id. at 52, associated with the view of the judge as “Hercules,” can easily
become a centrifugal force in constitutional law of the moralist deontological tendency.  Of
course, in interpretation, “[v]alue and content have become entangled,” id. at 48, and “the
claims and arguments participants make, licensed and encouraged by the practice, are about
what it means, not what they mean,” id. at 63.  But these features can be preserved and are
consistent with a more traditional view of the judge as a person who renders judgments of
reasonableness, in the process of constitutional interpretation.  Clearly, such judgments
implicate the deontological element of the Constitution, its purposes and values, from which the
point of constitutional practice is derived.  However, by portraying the judge as one who renders
judgments of reasonableness, one avoids the element of institutional activism involved in the
“Herculian” vision of judge.  For a synthesis of legal values and social reality while emphasizing
the dependence of judicial decision-making on the evaluation and differentiation of the various
social circumstances, see generally  GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORITY 68-
69 (1989).
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introduced by the law.86  One must distinguish three basic elements in
this analysis.
First is the category of people whom the law classifies on the
basis of some common feature or shared property.  Such categories
rely on the lawmakers’ acceptance of certain classifying criteria.87
Second is the class of persons who are either excluded by an
under-inclusive classification of law or included by an over-inclusive
classification.  In both situations, this element is defined according to
objective criteria, the factual and legal properties shared by its
members.  In the specification of this second category, practice sets an
objective horizon for constitutional argumentation and thus stabilizes
the interplay between reason and will.88
Third is the state interest.  Ideally, the classification of the law
and the classification according to objective properties, both factual
and legal, should coincide.  If that were the case, the law would be
flawless from the point of view of equality.  However, the dispute
over the law’s classification of what is discriminatory implies an
insufficient convergence of the two categories.  When a party
attempts to justify an over- or under-inclusive legal classification by
invoking the interest of the state, the decision-maker will need to
weigh the reasonableness of the classification’s criteria in light of the
importance of the state-interest that is promoted by the (over- or
under-inclusive) law.89
We can see how these elements interact in the various tests
developed by the Supreme Court of the United States.  With regard
to race classifications, the Supreme Court requires a compelling state
interest for constitutional justification of a racially discriminatory
law.90  The state can rarely meet the requirements of this strict-
scrutiny test.91  With regard to classifications based on gender, the
Supreme Court requires a substantial relationship to important
governmental objectives for the law to be constitutional.92  Finally, as
86. See generally G. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV 1 (1972).
87. See Joseph Tusman and James ToenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 341, 345 (1949).
88. See id. at 347-51.
89. See id. at 366-68.
90. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995).
91. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (holding that
classifications based on race can be justified by real military dangers).
92. See Personnel Administration of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); see
also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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to matters of economic regulation, the Court applies what some
scholars call the mere-rationality or rational basis test, in which any
logical connection between legal classifications and state interest
provides the purpose of the law and is usually sufficient to sustain its
constitutionality.93
In Greece, the constitutional doctrine of equality leads to an
inquiry into the proportionality of the law.  The analysis involves the
same structure and elements as the principle of equality under the
Constitution of the United States.94  However, the judgments of both
reasonableness (under the U.S. Constitution) and proportionality
(under the Greek Constitution) tend to prevent only the arbitrary and
capricious classifications.  In other words, the tests set only a negative
limit for statutory classifications.
Consequently, a judge has no authority to require an exact match
between the law’s classification and the objective category, even
though the two should ideally coincide.  A judge cannot impose the
best possible solution, which would lead to the merging of the
constitutional principle of equality with the ideal of substantive
justice.95  Only specific classifications leading to invidious
discrimination, such as race, gender, or religious creed, are per se
unconstitutional.  Beyond this, neither the U.S. constitution nor the
Greek constitution inhibits the priority of the legislator to introduce
the classifications that he or she thinks are appropriate.  However,
reason sets essential limits on legislative voluntarism by prohibiting
93. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
94. See Ioannis A. Tassopoulos,       * 	+
,+     
 	
 , IN D. KATSOULIS, N.
SOILENTAKIS, I. A. TASSOPOULOS,    
 
  	
	 	
	 [The Principle of Equality and the Unification of Electoral Districts in
Greek and American Constitutional Law, in  PROBLEMS FROM THE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
RECENT ELECTION OF PREFECTS] 57-127 (1997) (presenting a comparative analysis of the
principle of equality in Greece and in the United States of America).
95. See generally Frank I. Michelman, On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (arguing that although some scholars believe that “the
poor” should be afforded suspect classification, cases of alleged discrimination against the poor
should be given “minimum protection,” a less rigorous standard than that given to suspect
classifications).  Still, this goal, the merging of the constitutional principle of equality with
substantive justice, can hardly be achieved through “judicial reason” if the political and social
forces of a society are of a different will.  See also George Papadimitriou,   
.# .  / & 01234512216   
   [The Principle of the Social State in Post-war Greece
(1974-1991), in DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY TODAY] 131 (1993) (discussing the welfare
state in Greece).
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classifications that, in light of the objective factual and legal
properties of the situation at hand, are arbitrary and capricious.  In
this process, a judge does not substitute his or her own will for the
judgment of the lawmaker.
Discussing the objective factual and legal properties of the
situation implies that the various aspects of life, subject to legal
regulation and judicial review, have an intelligible structure and a
certain coherence that enhance specific values and purposes.  It is in
this respect that practice sets an objective horizon for constitutional
argumentation, stabilizing the interplay between reason and will.
When judges find classifications arbitrary and capricious or when they
evaluate the evidence regarding existence of covert discrimination
under a facially-neutral law, they work at the level of the legal
system’s practical operation.  A judge’s responses to the arguments of
the parties are not themselves legitimate as expressions of his or her
own will, but rather as rational analysis and objective interpretation
of the situation at hand.96
In summary, although the constitutional principle of equality
does not oblige the full implementation of the ideal of justice, it does
set a negative limit on statutory classifications, thus prohibiting
discrimination that, in light of an objective analysis of the situation
being scrutinized, turns out to be arbitrary and capricious or
invidious.  This combination reflects the interplay between reason
and will in an area as sensitive as the law of equality.  Constitutional
practice provides the bedrock to anchor legal arguments in their
objectivity and reasonableness, thereby limiting classifications that
emerge as groundless, unjustified, and excessively voluntaristic.
VII.  CONCLUSION
We have seen how Greek constitutional theory responded to the
different phases of Greek political history in an effort to strike the
appropriate balance between reason and will.  In the post–civil war
environment of the 1960s, the priority was to secure the locus of
sovereignty as the foundation of both reason and will. However,
under the Constitution of 1975/1986, respect for constitutional
96. Of course, only that practice that, at least in principle, is constitutionally justified, can
play this stabilizing role.  Therefore, the practice of separation between blacks and whites in the
South, though institutionally well embedded before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), could not provide a zone of convergence between the values recognized in the
Constitution and the operation of the legal system in social life.  It is only constitutionally–
validated practice that can contribute to the equilibrium between reason and will.
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fundamentals is well established. Political developments of that
period necessitated consideration of reason and will as distinct
aspects of constitutional decision-making.  The interplay between
these two elements became more flexible, more intense, and more
controversial.  According to some analysts, the prevailing element is
will.97  When there are no clear criteria compelling a certain result, the
question is one of authority (i.e., institutional competence to settle
the matter).  For other analysts, reason serves as the justification of
will and not vice-versa.  Using the principle of equality as an example,
we have seen how the concept of constitutional practice may be
useful in maintaining the balance between reason and will as elements
of the law.
Whatever the particular situation, Greek constitutional law must
tackle the problem of objectivity in constitutional interpretation.  The
long constitutional tradition of the country, which for over a hundred
years has practiced judicial review of the constitutionality of laws,
justifies the optimism that Greece will respond to the new exigencies
in a constructive and enriching manner.
97. See Venizelos, supra note 44.
